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Japanese Legal Reform in Institutional,
Ideological, and Comparative
Perspective
By FRANK K. UPHAM*

These remarks will not attempt to summarize or critique the
excellent papers presented at the symposium. The issues are too
broad; my knowledge, even as a commentator, is too shallow; and,
as many of the papers make clear, it is too early to know the
ultimate contours, much less pronounce judgment on the
attainment, of many of the individual measures. Instead, I will step
back from the vicissitudes of the last decade and try to put Japanese
reforms in an institutional, ideological, and comparative context.
First, much of the messiness, delay, and shortcomings of the reforms
are the inevitable consequences of top-down reform in a democratic
country. Second, the reforms depart substantially from "rule of
law" ideology, at least if we accept the conventional definition of
rule of law as the specialized application of legal rules to judicially
determined facts through a politically neutral, transparent, and
accountable process. Third, I believe that much of American
criticism of the Japanese legal system (and of other countries, most
prominently China) can be explained not by others' divergence from
global norms, but by Americans' obsession with individual process
and our meta-narrative of the individual confronting the state. I
present each perhaps contentious argument in the sections that
follow.

* Wilf Family Professor of Property Law, New York University School of Law. The
research and writing of this article were supported by the Filomen D'Agostino
Research Fund at New York University School of Law. I am grateful to Hank Zhou
for research assistance and to the editors of Hastings Internationaland Comparative
Law Review and the participants in the symposium, Successes, Failures,and Remaining
Issues of the Justice System Reform in Japan, for their corrections and suggestions.
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I. Japan Is Not Stalin's USSR: Excuses for Shortcomings and
Reasons for Limited Optimism
When Stalin decided to collectivize agriculture, he did not have
to negotiate with the kulaks. When Deng Xiaoping decided to
liquidate the communes and eliminate free education and health
care in the rural sector, he did not have to negotiate with Chinese
farmers. For better or worse, Japanese legal reformers operate in a
democracy. The more apt comparison for them would be President
Obama's passage of comprehensive health care. While it is true that
the Justice System Reform Council USRC) was more diverse, open,
and transparent than its predecessors, it could not itself legislate or
control the innumerable decisions to be made by the government in
its implementation of subsequent legislation. The interests of the
Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Supreme Court, the Japan Federation
of Bar Associations (JFBA), and university law faculties were going
to be heard, and where those interests conflicted with the goals of
the Council, they would have to be addressed. That is why we call
them vested interests - they cannot be easily destroyed in the
ordinary course of politics. Even worse, we can be quite confident
that the representatives of these institutions will not take as their
immediate goals the best interests of Japan as a whole or, in some
cases, even the long term interests of their own constituents. Instead
they will attempt to protect the interests of their direct principals
while couching their arguments in the terms of the greater good.
I am not being cynical. This process is not evil; it is democratic
politics. There are two sound reasons to accept if not celebrate the
role of interest groups like the MoJ or JFBA. First, experts, even
disinterested ones, can be wrong. The recommendations were not a
response to the demands of masses of citizens dissatisfied with the
basic structure of Japanese justice.
Members of the public
considered judges to be socially isolated, but the most visible push
for reform came from big business, which wanted an enhanced and
enlarged bar to increase its power vis-a-vis Japanese bureaucrats and
its international commercial rivals.' It was a top-down process
shaped by experts' views of how Japanese society and legal system
should evolve. By labeling it top-down, I do not mean that it was

1. Japanese legal academics also played a strong role, most notably Prof.
Setsuo Miyazawa, the organizer of this symposium.
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dominated by vested interests; nor is it meant as a condemnation. 2
Detachment and expertise are not bad things in policymaking, but
they are also emphatically not guarantees of wisdom. For
Americans of a certain age, this point can be brought home by the
simple evocation of the phrase, "the best and the brightest," the title
of a book chronicling the disastrous role of the most highly
credentialed political elites in guiding the United States into the
Vietnam War.
There is a second reason to accept interest politics even if we
acknowledge that a deliberative process of knowledgeable and
independent specialists will have a better shot at identifying the
national interest than leaving the protection of the hen house to the
foxes, as most deliberative councils have done in the past. But
acknowledging the value of detachment and expertise does not
mean that it should be followed unconditionally. Change, even
change unequivocally for the better, creates losers as well as
winners. As the United Nations noted as long ago as 1951 in the
context of development, "[v]ery few communities are willing to pay
the full price of economic progress."3 The UN was concerned about
subsistence farmers or handicraft weavers displaced by agribusiness and textile mills, not lawyers and law professors in one of
the richest countries in the world. The process, however, is the
same. One could argue that the proliferation of law schools could
have been avoided by forcing universities to choose between law
schools and undergraduate law departments, but doing so would
have gravely threatened the futures of the undergraduate law
professors. Similarly, proceeding steadily to the target of 3,000
annual test passers might have been consistent with the goals of the
reforms, but it would be na'ive to expect Japan's lawyers to give up
their cartel rents without a fight. Winners will always extol
intensified competition, but we are not all winners, and a
fundamental goal of the democratic process should be protecting
anyone from losing too much too quickly.
2. Far from being a closed process dominated by vested interests, Shunsuke
Marushima, former Senior Staff of the Secretariat for the Justice System Reform
Council and keynote speaker at this symposium, has noted that none of the 13
members initially advocated the introduction of lay participation. According to
Marushima it was the process of solicitation of public opinion that changed their
views.
3. U.N. DEP'T OF Soc. & ECON. AFFAIRS, MEASURES FOR THE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1951).
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It is important to note that I am trying to excuse and explain,
not celebrate. The frustration of social progress through the
democratic defense of one's comfortable status quo may be
democratic, but there is little else to say for the result, especially if
the aborted process has produced additional losers. Institutional
reform takes time, however, especially when the reform is as topdown and abrupt as this one has been, and there are signs of
eventual success.
The internationalization of the Japanese
commercial bar; the apparently seamless success of the saiban-in
system; and the active role of the prosecutorial review commission
are all reasons for optimism. When it comes to legal education, on
the other hand, it is hard to be celebratory. The declining bar
passage rate and especially the relatively low rates for those with
broader social experience, the return of the cram schools, and the
specter of the indirect path to the exam all bode ill for the emergence
of the socially integrated legal education and bar that was a
fundamental goal of the reform process. Even here, however, there
may be hope. While the declining number of applications and the
closing of some law schools are costly, they are also signs of a
shaking out of the system that may eventually - one hopes in years,
not decades - yield a passage rate that will allow the educational
innovations to realize the benefits envisioned for them.
II. The Move Away from Conventional Rule of Law Ideology
Whether or not my limited optimism is well founded, there is
virtually unanimous praise for the long term goals of the reform
measures that emerged from the JSRC process. I am not an
exception, but I find both the direction of these reforms and their
admiring reception intriguing from the larger perspective of what
type of legal system contemporary societies need and what rule of
law means in this context. To explain my reaction, I need to return
to the status quo ante, the Japanese legal system as it stood in 1999.
If one's most fundamental goal for a legal system is "the rule of
law, not men," it is difficult to find a contemporary legal system that
comes closer to that ideal, at least in its literal interpretation, than
pre-reform Japan. To provide a template for my argument, I
summarize sociologist of law Marc Galanter's essay The
Modernization of Law.4 Galanter looked first at the necessary
4. Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, reprinted in

LAW AND

THE
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characteristics of legal rules and determined that they must be
uniform and unvarying in application, rational and universalistic
rather than intuitive or unique, and transactional in the sense of
limited to facts legally relevant to the circumstances of the dispute.
To implement such rules, certain personnel and institutions are
required. Most fundamentally, juristic actors must be professionals.
To find the applicable rule, to interpret it correctly, and to focus
exclusively on its legal meaning all require specialized training,
knowledge, discipline, and socialization. That training begins with
legal education but to ensure that it is fully implemented, legal
institutions, of which the judiciary is preeminent, must deepen,
reinforce, and maintain professionalism. Without such relentless
policing of the disciplinary boundaries, the rules will not be
enforced uniformly and predictably against all legally identical
persons in legally identical situations. One might summarize such a
system as the substitution of stylized argument and reasoning,
hierarchical authority, neutrality, and procedural regularity for the
moral, social, or political context that would dominate a lay person's
reaction to the dispute.5
Whether one accepts this model as a noble goal for all societies
or dismisses it as a silly positivist caricature - my predilection
would be the latter - one cannot deny its rhetorical power in today's
world. A virtually identical version labeled "governance" has
dominated the World Bank and other international financial
institutions' lending criteria requirements since the 1980s, and
similar criteria under the express rule of law rubric constitute a
central part of America's diplomatic and aid policies toward
developing countries. Much of China's over two decades of legal
reform has been aimed at creating precisely this kind of legal
system, albeit only for nonpolitical cases. And yet Japan's legal
reforms are a direct retreat from such an ideal.
The most obvious examples of this shift are the saiban-in system
and the strengthening of the prosecutorial review comnuission.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1046-55 (Friedman & Macaulay eds., 2d ed. 1977). This
version of the rule of law will be seen by most readers as highly formalistic and was
certainly not the vision that dominated the reform process.
5. This description is of Japan's prereform legal system, not of the political and
bureaucratic systems. Indeed the deference of the courts toward administrative
action allowed bureaucrats wide discretion and flexibility that deviated from these
characteristics. See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN
(1987).
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Including lay persons in these processes will inevitably introduce
precisely the emotional, social, and political factors that "rule of law,
not men" is aimed at excluding. Furthermore, these changes
introduce these nonlegal factors into a legal system that had
succeeded in excluding them as well as any legal system in the
world has done. Although there is reason to think that the Japanese
judiciary was at least mindful of the political preferences of the
Liberal Democratic Party for the postwar period, 6 Japanese judges
otherwise epitomized the professionalism, competence, expertise,
and neutrality of a formalist model of the rule of law. They were as
immune from social pressures or extrinsic prejudices as a tightly
controlled bureaucracy could make them, and when they failed,
there was a rigid hierarchy to correct their mistakes and guide them
back to the straight and narrow path. Japan's procurators and
attorneys may not be as celebrated as its judges, but they are likely
more consistently competent and honest than their American
counterparts. 7
It is not only lay participation in adjudication that departs from
the rule of law ideals of neutrality and objectivity.
As David
Johnson's description of victims and surviving family members
tearfully begging for death sentences in capital cases brings
chillingly home, the new emphasis on victim and survivor
participation is all about the interjection of emotion and passion into
criminal cases, including the majority of cases still tried solely by
professional judges.8
It is theoretically possible that victim
participation is not meant to influence the verdict or the sentence. It
can be justified by the value of procedural participation - the idea
6. Frank Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the
JapaneseJudiciary, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 421 (2005).
7. Scholars have argued that the accuracy of the Japanese system of civil
litigation is the prime reason for Japan's low rate of litigation - if the system is
almost perfectly predictable, potential parties to litigation will know how
adjudication will come out and no one will sue. Whether one buys this argument,
the professionalism of Japanese jurists makes it plausible, something that would not
pass the laugh test if said about American adjudication. See J. Mark Ramseyer &
Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in
Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989). Because the saiban-in system applies only to
serious criminal trials, this reliability of civil adjudication should continue.
8. David T. Johnson, Killing Asahara: What Japan Can Learn About the Execution
of an American Terrorist, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.japanfocus.org/-David-T-Johnson/3832. See also Setsuo Miyazawa,
The politics of increasingpunitiveness and the rising populism in Japanese criminaljustice
policy, 10 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y, no. 1, 47-77 (Jan. 2008).
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that survivors will be benefited by having a chance to confront the
defendant and plead for his or her killing by the state - and still
maintain the principle that their testimony should not affect the
verdict or sentence. To argue thus, however, is not only exceedingly
naive, especially in capital cases where lay judges will be sitting; it is
also exceedingly cynical, at least unless survivors are told
emphatically that their testimony is for their own catharsis alone
and will have no impact on the trial or the penalty.
My point is not that lay participation is a bad thing. On the
contrary, the interjection of social values into adjudication is both
inevitable and an important link to popular legitimacy. 9 Legal
systems are invariably political creatures and if lay participation and
survivor testimony contribute to social trust in the legal system,
some departure from strict professionalism may not be too high a
price to pay. It is nonetheless interesting that in a global legal
culture where transparency and accountability are constantly urged
on developing countries, a movement away from these values by a
rich democracy would be praised with little attention to what seems
from one perspective to be a deviation from the perceived wisdom.
Legal transparency is not increased by adding non-professionals to
judicial panels, especially when the participants are forbidden to
discuss the process publicly.10 Nor is accountability. Japanese
judges are not politically accountable as are the many American
judges who must run for the office in partisan elections, but
collegiate decision-making and the scrutiny of the Supreme Court
Secretariat provide a level of professional accountability that is well
above that of the U.S. But the point may not be about legal accuracy
or competence at all. It may be about the sense of democratic
participation in one's government. The sense of having been heard
9. General social values are already part of adjudication through the "general
clauses" of the Civil Code (Articles 1-2 and 90), and the Japanese judiciary has
historically used these clauses aggressively. See Frank Upham, Stealth Activism:
Norm Formation by Japanese Courts, 88 WASH U. L. REv 1493 (2011). Of course, if one
buys the criticism of the prereform judiciary as socially isolated, these cases were
no more than the best guesses of this tiny group as to what society needed or
desired.
10. Mark Levin & Virginia Tice, Japan's New Citizen Judges: How Secrecy Imperils
9,
2009),
JOURNAL
(May
ASIA-PACIFIC
19
THE
Judicial Reform,
For another instance of the
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Virginia-Tice/3141.
Supreme Court's desire for confidentiality, see Daniel H. Foote, The Supreme Court
and the Push for Transparency in Lower Court Appointments in Japan, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1745 (2011).

574

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 36:2

is extremely important in whether someone considers an encounter
with the legal system to have been fair, and the value of
participation may resonate to society more generally, especially in
Japan where conventional wisdom is that citizens are more
deferential to government than in the U.S."1 That said, it remains
worth noting that this departure occurs in a world where global
legal reform rhetoric continues to preach the opposite course.
III. American Legal Culture and Foreign Legal Systems
I conclude with a brief reflection on the meaning of substantive
and procedural justice in the Japanese and American legal systems.
Japan's political system has been characterized as a performancelegitimated regime. 12 Japanese citizens trusted their government
because it delivered the goods. This characterization was often
contrasted with the United States, which was considered a processlegitimated regime.
Japanese voters returned the Liberal
Democratic Party to power repeatedly because of high economic
growth, low levels of inequality, social stability, international peace,
etc. They did not vote for the LDP because they felt they were
consulted by or actively participated in governmental policy and
decision-making or because the government was conducted through
open and accountable procedures. In the United States, by contrast,
citizens responded favorably to an active role in the government
and demanded open and accountable procedures. If the procedures
were understandable and appropriate, they could tolerate
disappointing results.
Since both countries were representative democracies, the
differences were on a spectrum.
But the differences were
nonetheless real, and their respective legal systems were central to
creating and maintaining the distinct natures of the two regimes.
11. For the effect of jury service, see JOHN GASTIL, D. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP WEISER
& CINDY SIMMONS, THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: How JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES
Civic ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010). It is interesting in this
context to note that the appearance rate of those called to serve as saiban-in is
considerably higher than that of Americans called to jury duty. See Supreme Court
Report. As of May 2012, 79.1% of Japanese summoned to serve as lay judges
appeared as directed.
12. This concept was elaborated at the symposium by Tom Ginsburg, who
argued that Japanese legal reforms were part of a political transformation from
"performance legitimation" to "participation legitimation."
See Ginsburg,
Competitive Modernization: 77e Politics of Legal & State Reform in Northeast Asia
(publication forthcoming, on file with the author).
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Since the early 1990s and the slowdown in economic growth,
however, Japan has begun to change, and its legal system and
specifically the reforms discussed at this symposium are an integral
part of this transformation. The Justice System Reform Council was
explicit about law's role in opening up Japanese government and
society, and many of the specific reforms can be interpreted as
creating a more open and accountable bureaucracy. The increase in
the number of legal professionals, the strengthening of the
prosecutorial review commission, the saiban-in system, enhanced
access to governmentally controlled information, and the easing of
restrictions to administrative litigation were all intended to give
citizens a greater sense of agency vis a vis their government.
Whether one characterizes this trend as "Americanization" or not,
they constitute a move toward a more participatory and
procedurally oriented regime, in other words, towards procedural
legitimacy and away from a purely result oriented, performancelegitimated regime.
Americans are likely to applaud this transformation. 13 We not
only utilize law and legal processes in a wide range of seemingly
nonlegal areas, but we are also enthusiastic proselytizers of our legal
values, or at least of what we would like to believe are our values.
Americans dominate cross-national legal reform efforts and
particularly international financial institutions like the World Bank,
and our Congressional granting of preferential market access to
developing countries that score well on rule of law indices gives
financial clout to our rhetorical aspirations. There is nothing
inherently wrong with such advocacy. Even when honored more in
the breach than in reality, due process and procedural justice are
worthy goals. In evaluating Japanese reforms, however, it may be
useful to keep in mind what may be lost when foreign legal systems
move closer to the American model.
Americans value process over result and equality of

13. Of course many Japanese share Americans' celebration of procedural justice
just as many Americans would sacrifice some process for more substantive equality
and fairness. I am dealing here with generalizations and stereotypes, but the fact
that generalizations and stereotypes are pejorative terms does not mean that they
See also Mark A. Levin, Circumstances That Would Prejudice
are incorrect.
Impartiality: The Meaning of Fairness in Japanese Jurisprudence, 36 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV 475 (2013) (included in this HICLR symposium issue). See also Levin,
Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on Instrumental Judicial Administration in
Japan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 289 & n.109 (2011).
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opportunity over material equality, and American law is legitimated
by elaborate and potentially dramatic procedures. In land use, we
grant a person whose land is being taken by the state and
transferred to a more productive or politically connected person a
long series of procedures through which to "fight city hall." In the
end, the development usually goes through, but due process has
been vindicated. In criminal justice, the gap between procedural
ideal and substantive reality is even starker. America incarcerates
fourteen times more people than Japan and five to six times more
people than China. The picture deteriorates further when one notes
that incarcerated Americans are overwhelmingly poor black males
convicted largely of non-violent crimes. Nor is it much consolation
to point to the procedural protections theoretically available to each
of these poor defendants. As we all know, the vast majority of
American defendants do not invoke the exclusionary rule or make
impassioned pleas to the jury. They plead guilty. It is largely the
relatively few rich defendants who take full advantage of each
procedural step. In these and countless other situations, Americans
erect elaborate procedures that allow us to believe in the virtues of
our legal system while simultaneously masking the injustice of its
operation. And yet Americans feel no hesitation in urging and at
times coercing other nations to adopt what we feel is a just system.
The days of active American legal proselytizing in Japan are
largely over, but the questions are the same: What are the possible
downsides of Japan adopting a more procedurally oriented legal
system? Does an enhanced "perception of fairness" mean a greater
tolerance of actual unfairness? For example, should the State
Department, when it awards millions of dollars for Americans to
help China reform its legal system in the American image, include
additional millions to build additional prisons? Does the shift from
a performance-legitimated regime to one premised more on
procedural and participatory values mean that Japan should expect
greater substantive inequality? My point is not that Japan should
ignore procedural justice and governmental openness. I intend only
a word of caution: Americans seem largely oblivious to the
substantive injustice of our criminal justice system and it is entirely
possible that our elaborate and dramatic system of procedural
justice helps us forget the actual results. One would hope that, as
Japan continues to shift toward a procedurally rich legal system, the
Japanese will be careful not to lose the substantive justice that has
been a hallmark of their legal system for the last six decades.

